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The implications of persistent and widening global current account im-
balances have been at the center of policy debates over the last half decade.
While the concerns subside each year, as a rapid unraveling of the imbal-
ances fails to materialize, the intellectual challenge of determining what
drives these imbalances remains. To the extent that some policymakers
view the conﬁguration of imbalances to be undesirable, a salient question
remains: what policies would cause those imbalances to shrink?
These imbalances are large. The U.S. deﬁcit was 6.5 percent of gross do-
mestic product (GDP) while China’s surplus was 9.1 percent, with bal-
ances in the next two years projected at 10 percent. The rest of the devel-
oping Asian region is running an average current account surplus of 5.4
percent.1 Finally, the sustained elevation in oil prices has added oil ex-
porters to the list of surplus countries. Figure 4.1 highlights the lopsided
nature of imbalances, with the U.S. deﬁcit primarily ﬁnanced by East Asia
and the Middle East.
As a consequence of the magnitude of their surpluses, China and other
Asian emerging market countries have often been identiﬁed as the main
causes of the widening U.S. current account deﬁcits. More speciﬁcally,
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Hiro Ito and Menzie Chinnthese economies’ underdeveloped and closed ﬁnancial markets are alleged
to be insuﬃciently attractive enough to absorb the excess saving in the re-
gion, resulting in a “saving glut.” Clarida (2005a,b) argues that East Asian,
particularly Chinese, ﬁnancial markets are less sophisticated, deep, and
open so that Asian excess saving inevitably ﬂows into the highly developed
U.S. ﬁnancial market. Bernanke (2005) contends that “some of the key rea-
sons for the large U.S. current account deﬁcit are external to the United
States” and remediable only in the long run. That is, it is the saving glut of
the Asian emerging market countries, driven by rising savings and collaps-
ing investment in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis, that is the direct
cause of the U.S. current account deﬁcit. Therefore, the long-term solution
is to encourage developing countries, especially those in the East Asian re-
gion, to develop ﬁnancial markets so that the saving rate would fall. Once
policies improving institutions and legal systems amenable to ﬁnancial de-
velopment and liberalizing the markets are implemented, “a greater share
of global saving can be redirected away from the United States and toward
the developing nations.”
Standing in stark contrast to the saving glut thesis is the more parochial
view that a fall in the U.S. national saving, most notably in the form of its
government budget deﬁcit, is the main cause of the ongoing current ac-
count deﬁcits—the “twin deﬁcit” argument. While the twin deﬁcit eﬀect
has been empirically investigated in the literature (e.g., Gale and Orszag
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Fig. 4.1 Current account balances by region (percentage of GDP)2004), as far as we are aware, very little investigation has been made to shed
light on the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on current account balances,
with the exception of Chinn and Ito (2007a).2 In this investigation encom-
passing a sample of eighty-nine countries over the 1971 to 2004 period, we
found that more ﬁnancial development leads to highersaving for countries
with underdevelopment institutions and closed ﬁnancial markets, which
includes most East Asian emerging market countries.3
This chapter takes a closer look at the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on
current account balances and the saving-investment determination. Fi-
nancial development cannot be deﬁned and measured simply (see Beck,
Demirgüe-Kunt, and Levine 2001). Chinn and Ito (2007a) used private
credit creation (as a ratio to GDP) as a shorthand proxy measure for ﬁ-
nancial development. Clearly, this is a simpliﬁcation with implications that
should be investigated. Hence, in this chapter, we undertake a closer look
at the eﬀect of diﬀerent typesof ﬁnancial development—whether banking,
equity, bond, or insurance-market sector—to gain diﬀerent insights. Ad-
ditionally, we investigate various dimensions of ﬁnancial development,
such as size, degree of activity, and eﬃciency. Given the ongoing asset mar-
ket booms in China and other emerging market countries in East Asia, size
measures alone might lead to misleading inferences.
Other factors are suggested by the current debate. Bernanke argues that
the openness of ﬁnancial markets can also aﬀect the direction of cross-
border capital ﬂows. Alfaro, Kalemi-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2003), on the
other hand, show that institutional development may explain the Lucas
paradox, that is, why capital ﬂows from developing countries with pre-
sumably high marginal products of capital to developed countries with low
ones. In short, ﬁnancial development might be mediated by ﬁnancial open-
ness and institutional development. Hence, we will examine interaction
eﬀects as well.
Our empirical analysis relies upon a data set composed of nineteen in-
dustrialized countries (IDCs) and seventy developing countries for the pe-
riod of 1986 through 2005. Financial development is assessed from various
perspectives: diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial markets such as banking, equity,
and bond markets, as well as diﬀerent aspects of ﬁnancial development such
as the size, activeness, and cost performance of the industry. The analysis 
involves making one key trade-oﬀ: in reﬁning the measures of ﬁnancial 
development, we reduce the set of countries covered, as well as the time
sample. We believe that the payoﬀto making this trade-oﬀis on net positive.
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2. Theoretical explanations for this phenomenon now abound. See Caballero, Emmanuel,
and Pierre-Olivier (2006) and Mendoza, Quandrini, and Ríos-Rull (2006).
3. Among East Asian countries, most countries (except for Hong Kong and Singapore)
could experience worsening current account balances if ﬁnancial markets develop further, but
that eﬀect is achieved not through a reduction in savings rates but through higher increases in
the levels of investment than those of national savings.To anticipate our results, we ﬁnd the following. First, we conﬁrm a role
for budget balances in IDCs when bond markets are incorporated. Second,
empirically, both credit to the private sector and stock market capitaliza-
tion appear to be equally important determinants of current account be-
havior. Third, while increases in the size of ﬁnancial markets induce a de-
cline in the current account balance in IDCs, the reverse is more often the
case for developing countries, especially when other measures of ﬁnancial
development are included. However, because of nonlinearities incorpo-
rated into the speciﬁcations, this characterization is contingent. Fourth, a
greater degree of ﬁnancial openness is typically associated with a smaller
current account balance in developing countries.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 recaps the debate over ﬁ-
nancial development, openness, and institutions, and how those factors
are related to the current pattern of current account imbalances, and sav-
ing and investment ﬂows. Section 4.3 details the empirical methodology
and results. Section 4.4 draws out the policy implications; section 4.5 con-
cludes.
4.2 Financial and Institutional Development and the Global Saving Glut
4.2.1 Theoretical Perspectives
We adopt a medium-run prospect approach to evaluate current account
behavior. Speciﬁcally, we view the current account as being driven by sav-
ing and investment behavior. Consequently, factors that aﬀect either of
these two ﬂows—such as demographics, trend income growth, terms of
trade volatility—should in principle aﬀect the current account. The re-
sulting empirical approach was implemented in Chinn and Prasad (2003).
The proposition that ﬁnancial development or deepening inﬂuences sav-
ing and investment behavior is by now well established. Conceptually, ﬁ-
nancial development is the process of increasing eﬃciency in the channel-
ing of funds from providers of capital to users of capital. In the end, the
capital should be directed to activities that have the highest rate of return
with the least amount of risk. Financial development might incorporate
the use of new information technologies, the establishment of organized
exchanges, and the other physical trappings of ﬁnancial activities. But
more fundamentally, it involves the reduction of information acquisition
and transaction costs, overcoming or managing information asymmetries,
and improving corporate governance.4 Clearly, ﬁnancial development
should then have implications for both saving and investment behavior.
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4. See King and Levine (1993), Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Wurgler (2000). This is the
basis for the argument that ﬁnancial development leads to economic growth. Levine (2005)
provides an extensive review on the “ﬁnance-growth link.”Unfortunately, the available metrics by which the progress of ﬁnancial
development can be tracked are less than fully ideal. We measure the pro-
cess by tabulating the size and activity of the banking sector, stock, bond,
and insurance markets, with an understanding of the limitations of such in-
dicators.
While the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on investment is relatively un-
ambiguous (i.e., positive), that on saving is not because higher returns and
lower risk of ﬁnancial investment create eﬀects on saving akin to income
and substitution eﬀects. The traditional view on the eﬀect of ﬁnancial de-
velopment on saving (such as Edwards 1996) suggests a positive associa-
tion between the two variables; further ﬁnancial deepening could induce
more saving through more depth and sophistication of the ﬁnancial sys-
tem. A contrasting view suggests that more-developed ﬁnancial markets
lessen the need for precautionary saving and thereby lower the saving rate.
This last observation is the basis for the saving glut thesis, leading to
Bernanke’s (2005) argument for greater ﬁnancial development and liberal-
ization as a long-run remedy to the global saving glut.5
Financial liberalization takes a central role in Kose et al. (2006). Liber-
alization can bring about more eﬃcient allocation of capital across coun-
tries. Another key aspect of ﬁnancial opening is that ﬁnancial liberaliza-
tion directly aﬀects international risk sharing. In an idealized world with
complete ﬁnancial markets (and only tradable goods), the location of in-
vestment should be independent of saving in order to ensure state inde-
pendent consumption-smoothing (Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ1996). However, as
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) originally pointed out, investment and sav-
ing are highly correlated. Although that correlation has diminished over
the years, the extent of the correlation remains nontrivial. In this environ-
ment, further international portfolio diversiﬁcation aﬀorded by greater ﬁ-
nancial liberalization could yield potentially large beneﬁts.6
Most directly related to the issue at hand, ﬁnancial openness can aﬀect
saving and investment determination and, hence, capital ﬂows across bor-
ders. According to the global saving glut thesis, ﬁnancial development cou-
pled with comprehensive ﬁnancial liberalization policies in East Asia would
mitigate savings levels and further allow excess saving to be “recycled”
within the region instead of ﬂowing into the United States. Similarly, Dooley,
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5. If one views the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on saving as that of asset markets on con-
sumption, the arguments about the wealth eﬀect of asset market performance as well as the
balance sheet eﬀects can be relevant to our discussion. However, our main focus in this chap-
ter is to examine the medium-run dynamics of the determinants of current account balances
and saving and investment. Therefore, we focus on the comparison between the ﬁnancial
deepening view and the saving glut view.
6. Tesar (1995) ﬁnds that the possible gains from further international risk sharing is min-
imal for developed countries, where ﬁnancial markets are well-developed and relatively open
and whose economies are relatively more synchronized with the world economy, while the
gains for developing countries are possibly signiﬁcant.Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2005) argue that, in the absence of a well-
functioning domestic or regional ﬁnancial system, East Asian countries es-
sentially lend capital to the United States at low interest rates in exchange
for eﬃcient ﬁnancial intermediation. The capital returns to East Asia in the
form of direct investment.
The eﬃcacy and integrity of the legal environment and the level of insti-
tutional development should also be important determinants for saving
and investment decisions. A society’s legal foundations and institutions de-
ﬁne the context wherein ﬁnancial transactions and economic decisions are
made. Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) ﬁnd that the cross-country diﬀer-
ences in legal and regulatory systems inﬂuence the development of ﬁnan-
cial intermediation.7 The literature identiﬁes a number of channels by
which legal and institutional development can aﬀect investment and sav-
ing decisions. Whether the legal system clearly establishes law and order,
minimizes corruption, or whether the administrative branch of the gov-
ernment protects property rights eﬃciently are all important determinants
of the incentives to save and invest. Decisions by foreign residents will also
be aﬀected.8
4.2.2 Stylized Facts: Financial Development, Openness, and Institutions
Figure 4.2 illustrates development of ﬁnancial markets in terms of the
market size, which we measure using SIZE, the sum of private credit cre-
ation and stock market capitalization (both measured as ratios to GDP).9
Throughout the period, most markets, notably the U.S., Western Euro-
pean, and Chinese markets (relative to GDP), have steadily grown. The ex-
ceptions are the Japanese and ex-China East Asian ﬁnancial markets,
which experienced some retrenchment after the bursting of the bubble at
the end of the 1980s and the ﬁnancial crisis of 1997 to 1998, respectively.
After the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, U.S. ﬁnancial markets have been the sole
winner in terms of the market size. The relative sizes of Western European
and Japanese markets are both about 58 percent of those of the United
States, and those of East Asian and Chinese markets are about half of the
U.S. ﬁnancial markets.10
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7. See also Beck and Levine (2005), Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruﬀ(2002), and Levine
(2005), among others.
8. Chinn and Ito (2006) ﬁnd that ﬁnancial openness leads to ﬁnancial development espe-
cially when a country is equipped with developed legal systems and institutions.
9. All the measures of ﬁnancial development are retrieved from the ﬁnancial structure 
data set created and subsequently updated by Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine (2001).
Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (2001) measures the overall size of the ﬁnancial system by sum-
ming domestic assets of deposit money banks with stock market capitalization (both as ratios
of GDP). However, because we want to focus on the private-sector development of ﬁnancial
markets that is more in line with ﬁnancial development in a real sense, we use private credit
creation instead.
10. Disaggregated pictures of the size of ﬁnancial markets show that the relative size of ﬁ-
nancial markets in terms of either private credit creation or stock market capitalization indi-
vidually are consistent with what is shown in table 4.2. However, ex-China East Asian coun-Beck, Demirgüe-Kunt, and Levine (2001) argue that the size of the ﬁ-
nancial system alone may not present a complete picture of ﬁnancial de-
velopment—a large ﬁnancial market could be a relatively sedentary one,
with little activity. Hence, one needs to examine the activeness of ﬁnancial
markets, for which we use stock market total value traded (as the ratio to
GDP; SMTV). Figure 4.3 compares SMTV across diﬀerent countries and
regions. Also in this ﬁgure, we can make the same generalizations as we did
in ﬁgure 4.2. The biggest diﬀerence from the previous ﬁgure is that the
strength of U.S. ﬁnancial markets is more pronounced when stock market
total value is used as the measure of ﬁnancial development; even the sec-
ond most active ﬁnancial markets, those in East Asia and Paciﬁc, are only
less than 40 percent of U.S. stock market total value (as a ratio to GDP).11
This is clear evidence that U.S. stock markets are far more liquid than those
in other regions and countries.
Figure 4.4 shows that the characterization of U.S. capital markets ex-
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Fig. 4.2 Financial market development (size)
tries’ and Chinese ﬁnancial market developments diﬀer from each other. While Chinese ﬁ-
nancial markets are more developed in the banking sector (its relative size to U.S. counter-
parts is about 63 percent), other East Asian countries are, on average, equipped with more de-
veloped equity markets (its relative size is about 81 percent).
11. Stock market turnover (SMTO) can be a measure of market activeness as well. We will
use the variable later as a measure of market activeness. When SMTO is compared in the same
way as other ﬁnancial development measures, it is shown that China’s stock market turnover
was impressively high in the 1991 to 1995 and 1996 to 2000 periods, more than one and a half
times as high as the U.S. ﬁgures. But this only reﬂects the fact that Chinese stock markets grew
from a small market size.Fig. 4.3 Financial market development (activeness)
Fig. 4.4 Private bond market developmenttends to private bond markets.12Even the private bond markets of Western
European countries and Japan are less than half of U.S. counterparts, and
only 22 percent and 9 percent for ex-China East Asia and China, respec-
tively, showing overwhelming strength of U.S. capital markets.
Public bond market development presents a diﬀerent picture, as shown
in ﬁgure 4.5. While oil exporting countries have had large public bond mar-
kets, Japan’s public bond market size is also increasing rapidly, reﬂecting
the sustained period of deﬁcit spending in response to years of stagnant
growth. The U.S. public bond market is still large compared to other re-
gions, but not as large as these two regions.13
Following Chinn and Ito (2007a), we measure legal and institutional de-
velopment using LEGAL, which is the ﬁrst principal component of law
and order (LAO), corruption (CORRUPT), and bureaucracy quality
(BQ).14 Figure 4.6 compares the level of legal and institutional develop-
ment of diﬀerent regions and countries with the United States, whose value
is normalized as 100. As one can expect, Western Europe and Japan have
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12. The variables for private and public bond market capitalization (PVBM and PBBM,
respectively) are only available after 1990 and for IDCs and emerging market countries.
13. In later sections, we use other measures of ﬁnancial development, those pertaining to
the cost performance or eﬃciency of the ﬁnancial (mainly banking) industry. INVNETINT
is an accounting value of bank’s net interest revenue as a share of its interest-bearing (total
earning) assets, inverted. OVERHEAD is an accounting value of a bank’s overhead costs as
a share of its total assets. For more details of data deﬁnitions, refer to the data appendix.
14. Higher values indicate better conditions. The choice of these variables is motivated by
the literature on the ﬁnance and growth, as well as the wide coverage aﬀorded by their use.
Fig. 4.5 Public bond market developmentachieved levels of legal and institutional development comparable to the
United States. The other regions lag the developed countries; their relative
levels of legal and institutional development are about 60 percent at most.
The degree of ﬁnancial openness is compared in ﬁgure 4.7 using the
Chinn-Ito capital account openness index (KAOPEN). This index is based
upon the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) categorical enumeration
pertaining to cross-border ﬁnancial transactions reported in Annual Re-
port on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).
Higher values of this index indicate greater ﬁnancial openness.15 Like the
LEGAL variable, ﬁnancial openness is compared relatively to the United
States. While East Asian countries slowed down the level of ﬁnancial
openness after the Asian crisis, both the Latin American and Middle East/
North African regions have been steadily opening their ﬁnancial markets
throughout the sample period. One outlier is China. Not only is the pace
of ﬁnancial liberalization slow, so too is its level low.
The preceding observations lead us to conclude that China and other
East Asian developing countries have achieved impressive—but uneven—
financial development. Especially when it comes to the bond market sec-
tor, East Asian economies continue to lag, despite initiatives to develop
these markets. Interestingly, while the extent of legal and institutional de-
velopment is comparable to other developing countries, China’s ﬁnancial
opening signiﬁcantly lags behind others as is evidenced by the U.S. persis-
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15. More details about the data are found in Chinn and Ito (2007b).
Fig. 4.6 Legal and institutional developmenttent demand to China for further ﬁnancial opening. In the following, we
will examine the eﬀects of further development in ﬁnancial markets and le-
gal systems with an eye to drawing out the implications of further opening
of ﬁnancial markets in East Asian emerging market countries.
4.3 Empirics
4.3.1 Speciﬁcation and Estimation
We estimate regressions of the general form:
(1) yi,t      1FDi,t    2LEGALi,t    3KAOPENi,t
   4(FDi,t   LEGALi,t)    5(LEGALi,t   KAOPENi,t) 
   6(KAOPENi,t   FDi,t)    i,t  ui,t,
where three dependent variables (y), the current account balance, national
saving, and investment, all expressed as a share of GDP, are regressed on
FD, a measure of ﬁnancial development; KAOPEN, a measure of ﬁnancial
openness; LEGAL a measure of legal/institutional development; and X, a
vector of macroeconomic and policy control variables. For FD, we will in-
clude a variable pertaining to ﬁnancial development depending on an anal-
ysis of our interest. Following Chinn and Prasad (2003), the vector X con-
tains control variables of “usual suspects” as the determinants of current
account balances, namely, net foreign assets as a ratio to GDP; relative in-
come (to the United States); its quadratic term; relative dependency ratios
on young and old population; terms of trade volatility; output growth
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Fig. 4.7 Financial openness by regionrates; trade openness (  exports   imports/GDP); dummies for oil ex-
porting countries; and time ﬁxed eﬀects. The sample for our analysis cov-
ers both industrial and developing countries. The underlying database has
annual data for nineteen industrial and seventy developing countries cov-
ering the last twenty-year period, 1986 to 2005.
For our empirical analysis, we use a panel that contains nonoverlapping
ﬁve-year averages of the data for each country. This approach mitigates the
eﬀect of measurement errors in annual data likely to be particularly prob-
lematic in data for developing countries. It also allows us to focus our in-
terest in medium-term rather than business-cycle variations in current ac-
count balances.16All the variables, except for net foreign assets to GDP, are
converted into the deviations from their GDP-weighted world mean prior
to the calculation of ﬁve-year averages—net foreign asset ratios are sam-
pled from the ﬁrst year of each ﬁve-year panel as the initial conditions. The
use of demeaned series controls for rest-of-world eﬀects. In other words, a
country’s current account balance is determined by developments at home
relative to the rest of the world.
As the preceding arguments have made clear, it is important to examine
not only the eﬀects of each of these variables, but also the interactions of
these variables. Hence, we include in the estimation the interactions be-
tween ﬁnancial development and legal variables (PCGDP   LEGAL),
those between the ﬁnancial development and ﬁnancial openness variables
(PCGDP   KAOPEN), and those between legal development and ﬁnan-
cial openness (LEGAL   KAOPEN). The ﬁnancial and legal interaction
eﬀect is motivated by the conjecture that deepening ﬁnancial markets
might lead to higher saving rates, but the eﬀect might be magniﬁed under
conditions of better-developed legal institutions. Alternatively, if greater ﬁ-
nancial deepening leads to a lower saving rate or a lower investment rate,
that eﬀect could be mitigated when ﬁnancial markets are equipped with
highly developed legal systems. A similar argument can be applied to the
eﬀect of ﬁnancial openness on current account balances.17
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16. Because we focus on medium-term dynamics, the predictions of the Mundell-Fleming
model are of limited relevance in this framework. For the same reason, we do not control for
the type of the exchange rate regime; it is not directly relevant to the level of current account
balances, but to the speedof current account adjustment. However, we will examine the eﬀect
of diﬀerent exchange rate regimes in the robustness checks. For the short-term current ac-
count dynamics, refer to Chinn and Lee (2006).
17. Bailliu (2000) shows that capital inﬂows, a proxy to capital account openness, can fos-
ter economic growth only if the level of domestic ﬁnancial development is above a certain
threshold, whereas Chinn and Ito (2006) ﬁnd that ﬁnancial openness leads to ﬁnancial de-
velopment especially when a country achieves a certain level of legal and institutional devel-
opment. As Chinn and Ito (2006) have shown, ﬁnancial development and ﬁnancial openness
can be highly correlated. However, inclusion of the interaction terms makes the model setting
nonlinear and thereby collinearity between these variables less of an issue, thereby allowing
us to identify independent eﬀects of these variables.4.3.2 Results from the Basic Model: Does Market Size Matter?
We ﬁrst examine whether the size of ﬁnancial markets (namely the sum
of bank lending and equity markets as a ratio to GDP) matters for current
account balances. Because these results are sensitive to the inclusion of the
African countries, we also report separate sets of results with and without
the African countries included for the developing country sample. We also
report separate results for an emerging market group that diﬀers somewhat
from the developing country sample.18
Table 4.1reports the results for the current account regressions for diﬀer-
ent subgroups. First, in contrast to the ﬁndings in Chinn and Ito (2007a),
the budget balance variable is not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional
levels for any of the samples. A 1 percentage point increase (above the world
GDP-weighted average) in the budget balance would lead to a 0.24 per-
centage point increase in the current account balance for IDCs and a
slightly smaller eﬀect for developing country groups, though none of them
are statistically signiﬁcant (with its p-value being 15 percent for IDCs and
ranging from 12 percent to 17 percent for developing country groups).
This result diﬀers from the results obtained in Chinn and Ito (2007a),
where a 1 percentage point increase in the budget balance would lead to a
0.15 percentage point increase in the current account balance for IDCs and
slightly higher results for developing country groups. The diﬀering results
are ascribable to the use of a diﬀerent measure of ﬁnancial development—
private credit—and a longer sample period.19
SIZE exhibits a negative coeﬃcient only in the IDCs, while its interaction
with LEGAL is signiﬁcantly positive for ex-Africa less-developed country
(LDC) and emerging market country (EMG) groups, and its interaction
with KAOPEN is signiﬁcantly positive for IDCs and signiﬁcantly negative
for developing and emerging market countries. This ﬁnding indicates that,
for IDCs, an expansion of the size of ﬁnancial markets tends to decrease the
current account balance. This eﬀect is mitigated if the country is more ﬁ-
nancially open. The coeﬃcient on the interaction term involving ﬁnancial
development and ﬁnancial openness implies that greater ﬁnancial openness
will increase an IDC’s propensity to export capital. Given these estimated
relationships, U.S. behavior appears even more anomalous.
The dynamics between ﬁnancial development, ﬁnancial openness, and
institutional development are diﬀerent for developing countries. The esti-
mated coeﬃcients for both ﬁnancial development and legal/institutional
variables are signiﬁcantly positive, while none of the SIZE coeﬃcients are
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18. The deﬁnition of emerging market countries relies upon the International Financial
Corporation’s (IFC) indexes. The group of emerging market countries in this study refers to
the countries that were included in either the IFC’s Global, Investible, or Frontier Index as 
of 1995.
19. Also the LEGAL variable was included as a time-invariant variable.Table 4.1 Current account regressions with the SIZE variable
LDC 
without 
IDC LDC Africa EMG
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Government budget balance 0.236 0.151 0.211 0.146
(0.162)15% (0.112) (0.134) (0.117)
Net foreign assets (initial) 0.058 0.042 0.037 0.043
(0.017)∗∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗
Relative income 0.101 –0.122 –0.028 –0.126
(0.038)∗∗∗ (0.097) (0.098) (0.113)
Relative income squared –0.452 –0.123 0.012 –0.139
(0.195)∗∗ (0.114) (0.118) (0.128)
Dependency ratio (young) 0.028 –0.012 –0.02 0.011
(0.038) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023)
Dependency ratio (old) 0.07 –0.016 –0.023 –0.011
(0.034)∗∗ (0.017) (0.017) (0.023)
Financial development (SIZE) –0.032 0.015 0.015 0.014
(0.015)∗∗ (0.010) (0.012) (0.009)
Legal development (LEGAL) 0.023 0.017 0.02 0.021
(0.012)∗∗ (0.009)∗ (0.011)∗ (0.010)∗∗
SIZE   LEGAL 0.014 0.015 0.013 0.019
(0.012) (0.006)∗∗ (0.008)11% (0.007)∗∗∗
Financial openness (KAOPEN) 0.016 –0.013 –0.014 –0.014
(0.012) (0.006)∗∗ (0.008)∗ (0.007)∗∗
KAOPEN   LEGAL 0.01 0.001 0.001 0
(0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
KAOPEN   SIZE 0.03 –0.006 –0.009 –0.008
[0.014]∗∗ (0.003)∗ (0.004)∗∗ (0.003)∗∗
TOT volatility 0.107 0.012 0.017 0.02
(0.071) [0.025] [0.024] [0.028]
Average GDP growth 0.146 –0.04 –0.229 0.069
[0.311] [0.151] [0.145] [0.163]
Trade openness 0.024 0.032 0.021 0.037
[0.016] [0.011]∗∗∗ [0.013]∗ [0.013]∗∗∗
Oil exporting countries 0.041 0.027 0.043
[0.013]∗∗∗ [0.018] [0.013]∗∗∗
No. of observations 81 156 125 125
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.55 0.52 0.59
Notes: IDC   industrialized countries; LDC   less-developed countries; EMG   emerging
market. All the variables to be included in the estimation, except for net foreign assets to GDP,
are converted into the deviations from the GDP-weighted world mean before being calculated
into the ﬁve-year averages. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The estimated coeﬃcients
for the time-ﬁxed dummies and constant are not shown.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.signiﬁcant for ﬁnancial development in any developing country grouping.
LEGAL is marginally signiﬁcant for LDC and ex-Africa LDC (its p-value
being 12 percent and 13 percent, respectively) and signiﬁcant for EMG.
The level variable for ﬁnancial openness is signiﬁcantly negative for all de-
veloping country samples, suggesting that a ﬁnancially closed country
such as China is more likely to run current account surpluses (or smaller
deﬁcits). The signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient for the interaction between
ﬁnancial development and legal development indicates that a larger ﬁnan-
cial market enhances the eﬀect of legal development. The signiﬁcantly neg-
ative coeﬃcient for the interaction between ﬁnancial development and ﬁ-
nancial openness indicates that a larger ﬁnancial market lessens the eﬀect
of ﬁnancial openness.
The interpretation of the regression coeﬃcients is complicated by the in-
clusion of the interaction terms. In the following, we will present some in-
tuitive interpretations using some numerical examples. For now, the key
stylized facts are that among developing countries, those with developed
ﬁnancial markets (in terms of their size), more advanced legal systems and
institutions, or closed ﬁnancial markets tend to run current account sur-
pluses. With this generalization, it is unsurprising that China, with a large
but closed ﬁnancial market, equipped with a mediocre index of institu-
tional development, is running a large current account surplus.20In this re-
spect, China at ﬁrst glance appears to ﬁt the saving glut thesis. We return
to this issue later.
The signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient for the oil exporting country
dummy in the LDC and EMG samples are consistent with the recent rise
in current account surpluses (and the accumulation foreign exchange re-
serves). Figure 4.1 demonstrates that the current account balances of
“Middle East and North Africa” rise and fall with oil price movements.
We also estimate the regressions for both the national saving and in-
vestment equations (results not reported). While the results of the current
account regression for IDCs and ex-Africa LDCs are more consistent with
the national saving regression (in terms of the signiﬁcance levels of the es-
timated coeﬃcients of our interest and the goodness of ﬁt of the model),
those of less-developed and emerging market country groups show greater
consistency with the results from the investment regressions than from
those of the national saving regression. In other words, ﬁnancial develop-
ment and its interactions with legal development and ﬁnancial openness
aﬀect current account balances through national saving for the IDC and
ex-Africa LDC groups and through investment for the LDC and EMG
groups.
Given that the SIZE variable is the sum of PCGDP and SMKC, we also
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20. The estimation results for the EMG group are found to be robust to exclusion of China
from the sample.ran regressions using each of the two variables in place of FD in equation
(1) to identify which of the components of SIZE is driving the results for
the regressions shown in table 4.1 (results not reported).21 In terms of the
goodness of ﬁt, it seems slightly more likely that the regressions with
PCGDP have a better ﬁt than those with SMKC. However, in terms of the
statistical signiﬁcance and economic magnitude of the estimated coeﬃ-
cients, we cannot determine which of the variables yield more consistent
results with those in table 4.1. At the very least, as far as the sample period
in this study is concerned, banking-sector and equity market development
seem to be equally important.
4.3.3 Results for Extended Models: Activity and Eﬃciency
Clearly, SIZE is unlikely to convey the full complexity of ﬁnancial de-
velopment. To capture how active ﬁnancial markets are, we use stock mar-
ket turnover ratios (SMTO) as the measure.22 Because an active market is
not necessarily an eﬃcient market, we also seek an eﬃciency measure. We
are not able to obtain such a measure for equity markets but rely upon a
banking-sector indicator, the net interest margin (NETINT). This variable
is the banks’ net interest revenues as a share of their interest-bearing (total
earning) assets.23 We invert this series (INVNETINT) and use it as a mea-
sure of market competitiveness of ﬁnancial markets.24 We reestimate the
equation (1) model using these two variables. Also, because one can expect
that market eﬃciency might aﬀect international investors in a manner de-
pendent upon market openness, we also include an interactive term be-
tween INVNETINT and KAOPEN.25
The results shown in table 4.2are promising.26Interestingly, inclusion of
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21. Both PCGDP and SMKC together cannot be included in the regressions because these
two variables are highly correlated with each other, thereby yielding the issue of multi-
collinearity.
22. In the previous section, we used SMTV as the measure of stock market activeness.
However, this variable is so highly correlated with SIZE that including both variables would
not yield meaningful results. Stock market turnover (SMTO) can be a misleading indicator
of stock market activeness because it is normalized by the market size, not the size of the
economy. However, because the estimation model already controls for the size of ﬁnancial
markets, SMTO can be a useful indicator of market activeness.
23. The rationale for the use of this variable as the measure of banking market eﬃciency is
that low net interest margin for a country means that banks in that country generally cannot
reply too much on interest revenue, which implies that banks must compete in a more com-
petitive market with low operating costs and low proﬁtability. Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and
Levine’s (2001) ﬁnancial structure data set also contains overhead costs (OVERHEAD) as
another variable to measure market eﬃciency for the banking sector. Our empirical results
are qualitatively unaﬀected when we use OVERHEAD instead of NETINT.
24. Originally, a higher value of NETINT indicates more interest rate margin, that is, less
competitive market conditions. However, to make its interpretation easier, we inverted the
variable such that a higher value of INVNETINT means less interest margin opportunities
and more competitive market conditions.
25. The following results are generally unchanged if we use OVERHEAD banks’ overhead
costs as a share of their total assets, instead of INVNETINT.
26. To conserve space in table 4.2, we report the results only for the variables of interest.
Complete results are available from the authors upon request.SMTO, INVNETINT, and interaction terms, has resulted in many hereto-
fore marginally signiﬁcant variables becoming more statistically and eco-
nomically signiﬁcant. Now the estimated coeﬃcients for ﬁnancial devel-
opment in all samples are signiﬁcant—negative for IDCs and positive for
developing country groups.27
For all developing country groups, SMTO’s coeﬃcients turn out to be
signiﬁcantly positive. This result suggests that countries with active ﬁnan-
cial (more particularly equity) markets might become capital exporters, in-
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27. The magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance for the oil exporter dummy increases as well.
Table 4.2 Current account regressions with the SIZE, SMTO, and NETINT variables
LDC 
without 
IDC LDC Africa EMG
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Government budget balance 0.187 0.228 0.231 0.237
(0.191) (0.113)∗∗ (0.152) (0.126)∗
Financial development (SIZE) –0.03 0.019 0.02 0.02
(0.013)∗∗ (0.009)∗∗ (0.011)∗ (0.009)∗∗
Stock market activeness (SMTO) 0.015 0.009 0.007 0.009
(0.012) (0.004)∗∗ (0.004)∗ (0.005)∗
Net interest margin (INVNETINT) –0.901 0.374 0.376 0.246
(0.505)∗ (0.152)∗∗ (0.197)∗ (0.152)11%
INVNETINT   KAOPEN 0.809 0.042 0.081 0.018
(0.367)∗∗ (0.066) (0.076) (0.062)
Legal/institutional development (LEGAL) 0.025 0.031 0.032 0.032
(0.011)∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗
SIZE   LEGAL 0.01 0.024 0.022 0.027
(0.012) (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗
Financial openness (KAOPEN) 0.019 –0.016 –0.017 –0.019
(0.010)∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗
KAOPEN   LEGAL 0.002 0 0.002 0
(0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
KAOPEN   SIZE 0.029 –0.009 –0.012 –0.011
(0.013)∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗
Oil exporting countries 0.054 0.05 0.048
(0.015)∗∗∗ (0.020)∗∗ (0.016)∗∗∗
No. of observations 77 140 114 112
Adjusted R2 0.56 0.63 0.58 0.65
Notes:IDC  industrialized countries; LDC  less-developed countries; EMG  emerging market. All
the variables to be included in the estimation, except for net foreign assets to GDP, are converted into
the deviations from the GDP-weighted world mean before being calculated into the ﬁve-year averages.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The estimated coeﬃcients for relative income, its quadratic term,
young dependency ratio, old dependency ratio, terms of trade (TOT) volatility, output growth, trade
openness, the time-ﬁxed dummies and constant are not shown.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.stead of importers, contrary to the saving glut thesis or Dooley, Folkerts-
Landau, and Garber’s (2005) Bretton Woods II hypothesis. When the na-
tional saving and investment regressions are examined (results not re-
ported), the results indicate that the positive eﬀect of stock market turnover
is driven by its signiﬁcantly positive entry to the national saving regression
(with no corresponding eﬀect in the investment regression). This result im-
plies that more active ﬁnancial markets can enhance national saving.
In IDCs, a reduction in the net interest margin contributes to a lower
current account balance although the interaction terms seem to cancel out
the linear eﬀect for ﬁnancially open countries. This means that an IDC
with more competitive, but less open, ﬁnancial markets tends to have
smaller current account balances. For developing countries, more compet-
itive ﬁnancial markets seem to contribute to higher net saving; the level
term of INVNETINT is found to be signiﬁcantly positive for the LDC and
ex-African LDC groups (and marginally so for EMG). This result is driven
more by the results in the investment regression, where both the IN-
VNETINT level and interaction variables turn out to have signiﬁcantly
negative coeﬃcients for the LDC and ex-African LDC groups, and only
the interaction term for the EMG group.28
Inclusion of SMTO, INVNETINT, and interaction terms increases the
statistical signiﬁcance and the magnitude of the variables of our main in-
terest, especially for the LEGAL variable and its interaction with SIZE
and KAOPEN. Given the obvious policy implications, we assess the sensi-
tivity of these results more extensively in the next section.
4.3.4 Robustness Checks
Before discussing the policy implications of our regression results, we
conduct a few robustness checks. These checks include accounting for en-
dogeneity of ﬁnancial development, alternative measures of ﬁnancial de-
velopment, accounting for the exchange rate regime, excluding periods of
ﬁnancial crises and aftermaths, and separating out oil exporters from our
sample. We address each of these aspects in turn.
With respect to the ﬁrst issue, ﬁnancial development itself could be en-
dogenous with respect to a country’s political and social infrastructure. Al-
though we have used nonoverlapping, ﬁve-year window panels to mitigate
the problem of reverse causality, it may still be worthwhile to conduct some
robustness checks. To examine this ﬂow of causality, we conduct two-stage
least squares (2SLS) analysis by instrumenting the SIZE variable with some
variables that can be the determinants of ﬁnancial development. Boyd,
Levine, and Smith (2001) show that inﬂation signiﬁcantly negatively aﬀects
both the banking-sector development and equity market activity. La Porta
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28. The results found in this exercise are robust when the United States is removed from
the IDC group and also when China is removed from the EMG group.et al. (1998) demonstrate that the national legal origin (whether English,
French, German, or Scandinavian) strongly explains cross-country diﬀer-
ences in ﬁnancial development. Therefore, we conduct 2SLS using inﬂation
rates and the dummies for the national legal origin as instruments.29
The instrumental variables regression analysis yielded qualitatively sim-
ilar results to those obtained before. In general, the estimation results are
slightly weaker for the IDC group. For less-developed country groups, the
statistical signiﬁcance rose for many of the variables of our interest, so did
the magnitude in some cases. At least, for developing and emerging market
countries, we can safely conclude that our results shown in table 4.1 are not
driven by endogeneity between the dependent variable and the ﬁnancial
development variable and its interactions.
There remain other types of ﬁnancial markets we have not yet examined,
such as private and public bond markets and insurance markets. In an
eﬀort to ﬁll that void, we construct an index that incorporates information
on other aspects of ﬁnancial development; we then reestimate the regres-
sions using this index (SIZE2) in the stead of SIZE. SIZE2 is the ﬁrst prin-
ciple component of private credit creation (PCGDP), stock market capi-
talization (SMKC), stock market total value (SMTV), private bond market
capitalization (PVBM), public bond market capitalization (PBBM), in-
verted net interest rate margin (INVNETINT), and life insurance pre-
mium as a ratio to GDP (LIFEINS). Figure 4.8 compares regions using
this ﬁnancial development index while normalizing the index of the United
States as 100. The historical patterns of ﬁnancial development are similar
to those displayed in ﬁgure 4.2. However, the underperformance of devel-
oping countries’ ﬁnancial markets as well as the U.S. relative strength ap-
pear more distinct, reﬂecting that developing countries lag behind in bond
and life insurance markets.
We repeat the exercise in table 4.1, using the composite index in place of
SIZE.30 Interestingly, the estimated coeﬃcients in the current account re-
gressions becomes more signiﬁcant for developing country groups, but not
so for the regressions involving the IDC group. For the LDC groups, all the
variables of our interest except for the interaction between KAOPEN and
LEGAL become more than 5 percent signiﬁcant.31 We also conduct the
2SLS analysis by instrumenting in the same way as described in the pre-
ceding. Although the estimated coeﬃcient for the composite index be-
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29. All instruments were included as ﬁve-year averages of the deviations from world
weighted averages. Also, the instruments found to be insigniﬁcant in the ﬁrst-stage regres-
sions were dropped.
30. The sample size is substantially reduced as PVBM and PBBM are available only after
1990 for a much smaller number of countries (especially for developing countries). Hence, the
LDC group becomes the same as the EMG group.
31. The coeﬃcient estimates in the national saving regression become more signiﬁcant for
the IDCs, whereas those of the investment become slightly less signiﬁcant. However, the re-
sults are qualitatively the same as what we have found for IDC and LDC groups.comes insigniﬁcant, other coeﬃcients behave similarly. The results are al-
most unaﬀected for the national saving and investment regressions.
There is a concern that one of the variables we have relied upon, private
credit creation as a ratio to GDP (PCGDP), might provide an inaccurate
depiction of ﬁnancial development. In some economies, a large portion of
ﬁnancial intermediary is provided by public ﬁnancial institutions, and the
credit provided by such state-owned ﬁnancial institutions to the private
sector is included in PCGDP. This issue can become a concern when one
uses this variable to proxy ﬁnancial development in China, a country where
the state has played a central role in the ﬁnancial system. In order to ad-
dress this concern, we adjust our measure by following the procedure out-
lined by Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2006). Speciﬁcally, we take the
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) estimates of the ratios of
government ownership of banks, and interpolate data over our sample pe-
riod.32PCGDP is then multiplied by (1 minus the ratio of government own-
ership of banks). Using this “adjusted” PCGDP, we reconstruct the SIZE
variable (SIZE2A).
The SIZE2A series are compared across diﬀerent regions and with the
136 Hiro Ito and Menzie Chinn
32. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) provide the estimates of the ratios of
government ownership of banks for ninety-two developed and developing countries for 1970
and 1995. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2006) use La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer’s data and interpolate the ratios for their sample period. Obviously, this method is not
perfect; eﬀorts of privatization are often discrete (e.g., after experiencing a crisis) and also are
not necessarily monotonic in movement.
Fig. 4.8 Comparison by “ﬁnancial development index”United States in ﬁgure 4.9. The eﬀect of the adjustment for government
ownership of banks is striking for developing countries. In the 2001 to 2005
period, the size of ﬁnancial markets for China, Latin America, and other
countries is less than 20 percent of the United States. In fact, China’s size
of ﬁnancial markets is merely 13.1 percent of the United States, conﬁrm-
ing that China still has a long road to ﬁnancial development.
Last, we reestimate the regressions using the adjusted SIZE variable. In-
terestingly, the results (not reported) are little changed, especially for de-
veloping countries. In other words, the results we have in table 4.1 are ro-
bust to the adjustment for government’s involvement in the ﬁnancial
sector. This result is somewhat surprising.
We also assessed the importance of the exchange rate regime. In our
model setting, there is no obvious reason why diﬀerent exchange rate
regimes should aﬀect the level of current account balances, though they
may aﬀect the speed of current account adjustment. While we do ﬁnd the
estimated coeﬃcient on the dummy for the crawling exchange rate regime
to be signiﬁcantly positive for emerging market countries, inclusion of two
other exchange rate dummies has little quantitative or qualitative impact
upon the results shown in tables 4.1 and 4.2.
Edwards (2002) argues that current account deﬁcits are correlated with
the probability of ﬁnancial crises occurring, suggesting that current ac-
count dynamics surrounding crisis years might exhibit anomalous behav-
ior. Taking the 1997 to 1998 period as one characterized as crisis years, we
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Fig. 4.9 “Adjusted” ﬁnancial market sizereconstruct the ﬁve-year panels to exclude this period and reestimate our
model. The estimation results remain intact. Similarly, we ﬁnd that exclud-
ing post-1995 data does not make a substantial impact on the results.
We also consider whether oil exporters behave in a fundamentally diﬀer-
ent manner than nonoil exporters. While we included an “oil exporter”
dummy variable in our basic regression speciﬁcation, if being an oil ex-
porter means that the slope coeﬃcients are substantially diﬀerent than
those obtaining for nonoil exporters, then a dummy variable is not suﬃcient
to address the issue of heterogeneity. When we exclude oil exporters from ei-
ther the LDC or EMG subsample, the results are virtually unchanged.
4.4 Policy Implications
One question that immediately arises is whether one should be surprised
at the current set of global imbalances, given the estimates reported in the
preceding. Figure 4.10 displays both actual and predicted current account
balances for the IDC group (panel A) and the emerging market group
(panel B). In panel A, we can see that the United States is one of the coun-
tries that experienced a larger current account deﬁcit than predicted by the
model.33 Panel B shows that many of emerging East Asian countries ap-
pear in the area above the 45-degree line; they experienced larger current
account surpluses than predicted by the model.34
4.4.1 The Eﬀects of Financial Development and 
Financial Opening for Emerging Asia
A second question that can be asked is what will happen to East Asian
current account balances if ﬁnancial development and liberalization ac-
celerates. Thus far, we have found some evidence that ﬁnancial develop-
ment aﬀects current account balances. Here, we need to interpret how the
estimated coeﬃcients on ﬁnancial development variable (SIZE) would
aﬀect current account balances, national saving, and investment in inter-
action with other institutional variables (LEGAL and KAOPEN). Also,
we examine the eﬀect of ﬁnancial opening conditional upon the levels of ﬁ-
nancial and legal/institutional development.
Panels A, B, and C in ﬁgure 4.11 shows the total eﬀect on current ac-
count, national saving, and investment (in terms of percentage points as a
ratio to GDP), respectively, if the size of ﬁnancial markets (SIZE) rises by
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33. The 45-degree line refers to the points where both actual and predicted values are the
same. Hence, in the area above the 45-degree line, actual values are higher than predicted
ones, meaning that countries’ current account balances are underpredicted by the model.
34. The prediction errors shown in ﬁgure 4.10 are consistent with either model misspeciﬁ-
cation or current account behavior being delinked from the fundamentals (and, hence, being
unsustainable). Determination of which interpretation is more appropriate is outside the
scope of this chapter. Refer to Clarida (2007) for a debate regarding the issue of current ac-
count sustainability.10 percentage points above the world weighted average conditional on the
levels of LEGAL and KAOPEN for emerging market countries.35 The cal-
culation is made based on the regression results shown in column (4) of
table 4.2 and depending on whether the levels of LEGAL and KAOPEN
are in the low decile, mean, or high decile in each subsample. This exercise 
illustrates how the impact of ﬁnancial development can vary with the level
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35. Between the 1996 to 2000 and 2001 to 2005 time periods, the (ﬁve-year average of rel-
ative) SIZE level—the level of ﬁnancial deepening above or below the weighted world aver-
age—increased by 16.3 percentage points for Asian emerging market countries and an as-
tounding 39 percentage points for China. Therefore, examining the eﬀect of a 10 percentage
point increase is not too unrealistic. This calculation holds other variables constant, includ-
ing the level of stock market activeness (SMTO) and market eﬃciency (INVNETINT).
Fig. 4.10 Actual current account balances and in-sample predictions: A, Industri-




































































































































































































































































































































.of these two variables. For example, panel A shows that a 10 percentage
point increase in SIZE (expressed as the deviation from the world weighted
average) can lead an emerging market country equipped with both legal de-
velopment and ﬁnancial openness levels above the low 10th percentile (i.e.,
the bar at the northwest corner on the ﬂoor) to lower its current account as
a ratio to GDP by 0.186 percentage points. Examining the bars at the same
location in the other two panels allows us to determine whether the eﬀect of
such a change comes from national saving or investment or both.
Theoretically, the total eﬀects of ﬁnancial development shown in the pan-
els on national saving and investment should add up exactly to that on cur-
rent account balances. However, as can be seen in the ﬁgures, this is not the
case. At least two reasons can be identiﬁed for this outcome. First, while the
current account regressions account for the covariance of national savings
and investment, simply adding two coeﬃcients does not.36 Second, due to
diﬀering data conventions (balance of payments accounting versus national
income accounting deﬁnition), the ﬂows may not add up exactly. However,
it is still worthwhile to examine the total eﬀect on all three variables.
For emerging market countries, we can generalize the total eﬀect of ﬁ-
nancial development on current account balances as that the more ﬁnan-
cially open and the less legally/institutionally developed an emerging mar-
ket country is, the more negative the total eﬀect of ﬁnancial development
on the current account balance is to be. The result seems to be driven by
the eﬀects on both national saving and investment. Those countries that
experience current account deterioration experience both deterioration in
national saving and improvement in investment (except for those with
mean KAOPEN and mean LEGAL).
Panel D of ﬁgure 4.11 categorizes emerging market countries in East
Asia depending on the level of legal development and ﬁnancial openness.
The matrix shows that only Hong Kong and Singapore are categorized as
countries with highest 10th percentile legal development and highest 10th
percentile ﬁnancial openness, while many Asian emerging market coun-
tries, including China, are categorized in the groups with the middle or
lower level of legal development and ﬁnancial openness. For these econ-
omies, ﬁnancial development might lead to deterioration of current ac-
count balances if the economy is more open than the bottom decile and its
legal systems are not in the top decile.
What about ﬁnancial opening? We have seen that China in particular has
kept its ﬁnancial markets closed, sparking considerable debate over what
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36. If some change in one variable aﬀects national saving and investment independently,
as long as the change in national saving and investment does not aﬀect each other, the net
eﬀect of the change ( NS –  I) would be the same as that on current account balances. How-
ever, if national saving and investment are highly correlated, as has been found in many stud-
ies such as Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and Frankel, Dooley, and Mathieson (1987), simply
adding two coeﬃcients does not yield the coeﬃcient in the current account regression.would occur in the event of capital account liberalization. Figure 4.12 pres-
ents a parallel analysis to what we did in ﬁgure 4.11, but this time, we ex-
amine the total eﬀect of ﬁnancial opening, a one unit increase in KAOPEN,
conditional upon the level of legal/institutional development and the size of
ﬁnancial markets. Panels A, B, and C report the total eﬀect of ﬁnancial
opening on current account balances, national saving, and investment, re-
spectively, for emerging market countries, and panel D ranks East Asian
emerging market countries by the level of ﬁnancial openness measured by
KAOPEN.
Panel A of ﬁgure 4.12 indicates that ﬁnancial opening, holding the lev-
els of both legal and ﬁnancial development constant, would result in a typ-
ical emerging market economy experiencing a deteriorating current ac-
count balances, except when the economy is ﬁnancially underdeveloped.
Panels B and C show that the deterioration can be driven by either a large
decrease in national saving combined with a smaller decrease in investment
or a relatively smaller decrease in national saving combined with an im-
provement in investment. Either outcome is consistent with the saving glut
hypothesis, although our results lead to a more nuanced view of the
sources of the current account shift.
A one unit increase in KAOPEN is equivalent to China increasing its
level of ﬁnancial openness to that of Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. If one
uses the observed Chinese values of SIZE, LEGAL, and KAOPEN, the im-
plied impact on China’s current account balance would be a 1 percentage
point decline. Considering that the size of current account surplus for the
2001 to 2005 period is 3.5 percent, this is not a nontrivial eﬀect, although it
must be kept in mind that the posited change in openness is very large.
One caveat involves the proper measure of ﬁnancial development in
China, a particularly salient issue. If one measures ﬁnancial market size
adjusting for government bank ownership, the eﬀect would be consider-
ably smaller, about 0.35 percentage points. Thus, we believe the question of
how much the Chinese current account balance would be aﬀected by cap-
ital account opening remains an open one.
4.4.2 A Magniﬁcation Eﬀect of Bond Markets?
Our discussion thus far has focused on the Western side of the Paciﬁc
Ocean, with little reference to the United States. The observation that the
United States attracts capital from the rest of the world because of its deep
and sophisticated ﬁnancial markets has become something of a cliché. One
separate, but related, line of argument is that for such an economy, ﬁnan-
cial development can function as a magniﬁer for the eﬀect of other saving-
investment determinants, especially budget balances. The idea is that a
country with highly developed ﬁnancial markets may ﬁnd its budget con-
straint relaxed because its highly developed ﬁnancial markets make it































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.easier for the government to ﬁnance its budget. Chinn and Ito (2007a) were
unable to ﬁnd any evidence for this conjecture. Here, we take the opportu-
nity to reexamine the magniﬁer eﬀect with reference to the link between the
budget and current account balances.
Table 4.3 reports the regression results that incorporate the eﬀect of
public bond market development (measured by PBBM, public bond mar-
ket capitalization as a ratio to GDP) and its interactive, that is, magniﬁer,
eﬀect with budget balances. Columns (1) and (2) show the results for in-
dustrialized and emerging market countries, respectively, when the PBBM
variable and its interaction with the budget balance variable are added to
our basic model.37 Because the PBBM data are limited, there is only an
EMG group among the developing country groups. Columns (3) and (4)
include stock market turnover, net interest margin, and its interaction with
KAOPEN. Interestingly, for the IDC group, whether in column (1) or (3),
the interaction term enters signiﬁcantly. For emerging market countries,
the level term for PBBM is signiﬁcantly negative, but the interaction term
is insigniﬁcant. The signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on PBBM for emerging market
countries may reﬂect the tendency that emerging market countries attempt
to borrow abroad to ﬁnance their budgetary programs. Using the actual
ﬁve-year average of the U.S. budget balance and the estimates from col-
umns (1) and (3), the estimated coeﬃcient of is found to be as high as 0.487
and 0.642, respectively. These ﬁgures are around the high end of the value
range of 0.10 to 0.49 found in Chinn and Ito (2007a).
As was shown in ﬁgure 4.5, Japan and oil exporting countries in the
Middle East, both of which are big current account surplus countries,
could be driving the results as outliers. Also, the magniﬁer eﬀect of ﬁnan-
cial development can be more important for those countries that try to ﬁ-
nance themselves from foreign capital. Therefore, we reestimated by re-
stricting our sample to only country years when the net foreign assets (that
are included only from the ﬁrst year of each ﬁve-year panel) are negative.
The results are shown in columns (5) and (6) for industrial and emerging
market countries, respectively. Now in these speciﬁcations, the signiﬁcance
of the estimated coeﬃcient on the interaction term disappears for the IDC
group, though the signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the PBBM variable remains for
the EMG group. However, interestingly, the estimated coeﬃcient on bud-
get balances for IDCs remains signiﬁcant, and its magnitude is still high,
0.48 (the p-value for the interaction term is now 22 percent). At the very
least, budget balances seem to play an important role for current account
balances for IDCs.
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37. We also include a dummy for Japan because, as ﬁgure 4.5 shows, Japan, a country with
not only a big public bond market, but also big current account surpluses, can be driving the
results as an outlier. In fact, the estimated coeﬃcient for the dummy is found to be signiﬁ-
cantly positive.4.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have taken a closer look at the eﬀect of ﬁnancial de-
velopment on the present conﬁguration of global imbalances. In particu-
lar, we scrutinized the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development from various per-
spectives: diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial markets such as equity, bond, and
insurance markets as well as diﬀerent aspects of ﬁnancial development
such as the cost performance, size, and activeness of the industry. We also
examined the role of nonlinearities, in terms of interactions with ﬁnancial
openness and institutional development.
The empirical results from our basic model suggest that the size of ﬁnan-
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Table 4.3 The impact of public bond market development in current account regressions
Debtor Debtor
IDC EMG IDC EMG IDC EMG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Government budget  0.503 0.105 0.619 0.199 0.481 0.076
balance (0.153)∗∗∗ (0.300) (0.176)∗∗∗ (0.309) (0.241)∗ (0.366)
Budget balance   PBBM –0.767 –0.216 –1.11 0.628 –0.741 0.952
(0.394)∗ (1.116) (0.278)∗∗∗ (1.375) (0.590) (1.664)
Public bond market  0.005 –0.054 –0.004 –0.135 0.016 –0.144
development (PBBM) (0.017) (0.038) (0.015) (0.036)∗∗∗ (0.019) (0.038)∗∗∗
Financial development  –0.022 0.013 –0.027 0.02 –0.034 0.038
(SIZE) (0.011)∗ (0.014) (0.012)∗∗ (0.012) (0.015)∗∗ (0.016)∗∗
Stock market activeness  0.022 0.016 0.027 0.015
(SMTO) (0.009)∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗ (0.006)∗∗
Net interest margin  –0.332 0.686 –0.309 0.616
(INVNETINT) (0.445) (0.238)∗∗∗ (0.460) (0.306)
∗
NETINT   KAOPEN –0.395 0.226 –0.327 0.208
(0.493) (0.083)∗∗∗ (0.518) (0.108)∗
Legal/institutional 0.02 0.019 0.016 0.032 0.026 0.027
development (LEGAL) (0.010)∗∗ (0.013) (0.011) (0.010)∗∗∗ (0.015)∗ (0.013)∗∗
SIZE   LEGAL 0.024 0.016 0.031 0.028 0.034 0.025
(0.012)∗ (0.009)∗ (0.012)∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗ (0.014)∗∗ (0.010)∗∗
Financial openness –0.008 –0.024 –0.011 –0.026 –0.015 –0.022
(0.009) (0.010)∗∗ (0.009) (0.009)∗∗∗ (0.011) (0.010)∗∗
KAOPEN   LEGAL 0.022 –0.002 0.022 –0.001 0.022 –0.002
(0.006)∗∗∗ (0.003) (0.009)∗∗ (0.003) (0.010)∗∗ (0.003)
KAOPEN   SIZE 0.005 –0.009 0.001 –0.017 –0.003 –0.012
(0.011) (0.004)∗∗ (0.010) (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.011) (0.006)∗∗
No. of observations 80 72 76 65 55 58
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.60 0.71 0.77 0.63 0.49
Notes: See table 4.2 notes. There are no oil exporting countries in any of the subsamples.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.cial markets does matter for saving and investment determination. Among
developing countries, those with developed ﬁnancial markets (in terms of
their size), better legal systems and institutions, or closed ﬁnancial markets
tend to run current account surpluses. We also found that banking-sector
and equity market development seem to be equally important.
We also extended our basic model by including variables that control for
the degree of activity of ﬁnancial markets, as well as for market competi-
tiveness. Based upon the results from this extended model, we determined
that that an IDC with more competitive, but less open, ﬁnancial markets
tends to run larger current account surpluses. For developing countries,
more competitive ﬁnancial markets result in a tendency to run larger cur-
rent account surpluses, a ﬁnding in contradiction to the saving glut thesis.
Also, developing countries with active equity markets tend to become cap-
ital exporters, largely because more active equity markets induce greater
national savings. This result is again in contradiction to the saving glut hy-
pothesis.
Generally, we found that for emerging market countries, ﬁnancial devel-
opment may lead to deterioration of current account balances if the econ-
omy exhibits greater than the average openness and a legal system not in
the top decile. In other cases, this linkage is not apparent. Moreover,
greater ﬁnancial opening tends to make an emerging market economy run
a smaller current account surplus, especially if the economy is ﬁnancially
underdeveloped.
We also investigated whether ﬁnancial development—rather than shift-
ing the saving and investment schedules—magniﬁes the impact of other
determinants of saving and investment behavior. More speciﬁcally, we ex-
amined whether public bond markets contribute to relaxing budget con-
straints and jointly to aﬀecting current account balances. We ﬁnd some
limited evidence in favor of such a magniﬁcation eﬀect. One interesting
ﬁnding is that inclusion of a bond market variable results in an estimated
impact of the budget balance on the current account balance that is sub-
stantially higher than that obtained in many other studies, including our
previous study (Chinn and Ito 2007a).
Overall, our investigation revealed numerous results relevant to the de-
bate over the sources of global imbalances. At the minimum, we have
demonstrated that these two hypotheses might have not be exclusionary.
First, as we have shown in our previous study, budget balances should not
be ruled out as a determinant of current account balances. A 1 percentage
point improvement in the budget balance can lead to about half a percent-
age point improvement in current account balances for IDCs. Second,
when we focus on the competitiveness of banking markets or the activeness
of capital markets as a measure of ﬁnancial development, we ﬁnd the evi-
dence against the saving glut hypothesis. That is, more competitive bank-
ing markets or more active equity markets do not necessarily lead coun-
146 Hiro Ito and Menzie Chinntries to become greater capital importers. Third, in terms of the size, ﬁ-
nancial development does matter for current account balances, but the
eﬀect is conditional upon other institutional factors such as capital ac-
count openness and legal or institutional development. Fourth, greater ﬁ-
nancial openness leads to a deterioration of the current account, in a man-
ner consistent with some aspects of the saving glut hypothesis. That is,
countries with more developed legal systems and more developed ﬁnancial
markets (in terms of the size) tend to experience smaller current account
surpluses.
Data Appendix
The data used in this chapter were drawn from a number of diﬀerent
sources. In the following, we provide a listing of the mnemonics for the
variables used in the analysis, descriptions of these variables and the
source(s) from which the primary data for constructing these variables
were taken. A listing of the countries in the ﬁnal sample, along with the
country groupings used in the analysis, is provided in the working paper
version of this chapter. For most countries, data were available from 1971
through 2005.
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Table 4A.1 Data
Mnemonic Source Variable description
CURRENT WDI, IFS, WEO Current account to GDP ratio
NATL_SAVING WDI National saving to GDP ratio
GROSS_KF WDI Capital formation to GDP ratio
GSUR WDI, IFS General government budget balance, ratio to GDP
NFA LM Stock of net foreign assets, ratio to GDP
RELY WDI Relative per capita income, adjusted by purchasing power 
parity (PPP) exchange rates, measured relative to the
United States, range (0 to 1)
RELDEPY WDI Youth dependency ratio, population under ﬁfteen/
population between ﬁfteen and sixty-ﬁve
RELDEPO WDI Old dependency ratio, population over sixty-ﬁve/
population between ﬁfteen and sixty-ﬁve
YGRAVG WDI Average real GDP growth
TOTSD WDI Standard deviation of terms of trade
OPEN WDI Openness indicator: ratio of exports plus imports of goods 
and nonfactor services to GDP
SIZE BDL, Authors’  Financial market development in terms of its size, 
calculations PCGDP   SMKC
PCGDP BDL Private credit creation as a ratio to GDP
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Comment Edwin Lai
My comments incorporate not just my discussion during the conference
but also my reaction after reading the latest version of the chapter. This
chapter is about ﬁnancial development and current account balances. It
looks at the eﬀect of various aspects of ﬁnancial development on current
account (CA) balances and saving-investment determination. The chapter
is mainly motivated by Bernanke’s (2005) “global saving glut” hypothesis.
The hypothesis can be brieﬂy stated as follows:
1. The U.S. current account deﬁcit is mainly determined by the low cost
of borrowing made possible by the huge inﬂows of funds from emerging
markets, such as China and the rest of East Asia.
2. Investment demand in the United States has been very strong (or the
United States is an attractive destination for investment) in the last ten
years or so because of its political stability, strong property rights, good
regulatory environment, and strong performance in the equity market and
later the property market (following the dot-com bubble burst).
3. The CA deﬁcit has very little to do with the large budget deﬁcit of the
United States.
4. The U.S. current account deﬁcit is determined by factors beyond the
U.S. borders.
Bernanke thinks that the solution to this “unnatural” reversal of roles of
the less-developed countries (LDCs) being lenders and developed coun-
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